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1. Introduction 
Tolerating great gaps between theory and practice implies that we have so 
distanced ourselves from reality that we are no longer informed observers of 
human society (V. Ostrom 2008b, p. 178). 
 Beginning at least as early as 1961 and repeatedly until the end of his career as a scholar, 
Vincent Ostrom challenged what he called “the intellectual mainstream” in American public 
administration and political theory
1
 (V. Ostrom 2008b, 1977, 2011 [1971], 2012 [1993], 2012 
[1994], 1997; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961).
2
  This essay evaluates the proposition that 
Vincent Ostrom was more than an engaged critic, that his political theorizing and the research it 
informs comprise a revolutionary alternative to the mainstream in political science and policy 
analysis.  I proceed by addressing two questions.  What are the bases for differentiating Vincent 
Ostrom’s theorizing and the research informed by his theorizing from the intellectual mainstream 
of political and public administration theory?  To what extent do these differences substantiate 
Ostrom’s claim that the art and science of association he proposes constitutes a paradigm 
challenge to the intellectual mainstream?   
I address these questions in three parts.  Section 2 describes Ostrom’s normative aim, the 
logic behind his critique, and their influence on his writing.  Section 3 evaluates the assertion that 
the body of research associated with The Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis 
Indiana University
3
 (co-founded and led for many years by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, 
                                                          
1
 He also found common cause with other critics of the mainstream.  Vincent Ostrom was a founding delegate to the 
April 1963 “no name” conference in Charlottesville and served as Society President (1967-69), a duty also fulfilled 
by Elinor Ostrom (1982-84). 
2
 To distinguish the authorship of Vincent or Elinor Ostrom, parenthetical citations include the first initial.  
References in the text employ first and last names, except where the context clearly implies the author’s identity. 
3
 The Workshop was renamed The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis in 
honor of its founding co-directors.  The author holds a Ph.D. in political science from Indiana University and was a 
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hereinafter referred to as The Workshop) meets the definitional conditions of an alternative 
scientific paradigm.  Section 4 further evaluates the central proposition by differentiating 
Ostrom’s epistemic and theoretical commitments from the intellectual mainstream.  The essay 
concludes with a few comments on the continuing relevance of Ostrom’s critique to political 
theory and policy analysis in the post-9/11 era. 
2. Vincent Ostrom as a political theorist and critic of the intellectual mainstream   
Reflecting on the obvious shortcomings of urban, race relations, and environmental 
policy in 1971, Vincent Ostrom offered a suggestion.  “Perhaps this is an occasion that we 
should entertain an outlandish hypothesis: that our teachings contain much bad medicine” (V. 
Ostrom 2008b, p. 4).  He thereupon attributes the hypothesized “bad medicine” to a disciplinary 
mainstream then calling for evermore consolidation of public authority, rationally organized in 
systems of centralized bureaucratic administration (ibid.).  Ostrom’s logic is elegant, 
parsimonious, and persuasive.  Laws, policies, and public institutions are artifacts made by 
humans (V. Ostrom 1980).  No artifact can violate the laws of nature and serve its intended 
purpose (ibid.).  Political experiments that rely on unwarranted premises are likely to generate 
counter-intentional outcomes (V. Ostrom 1994, 2008b, 2012 [1993]).  Highly centralized policy 
designs rely for effect on three impossible conditions—omnicompetent public officials, 
omniscient legislators, and the perfection of a uniform and universal system of laws (V. Ostrom 
2008b, 1997, 2011 [1999, 1975], pp. 339f., 2012 [1991], p. 286, 2012 [1994], pp. 323f.). 
The logical refutation of monocentric theories of public administration indicates the 
larger aim of Workshop scholarship organized around articulating and testing propositions 
related to polycentric theories of social order.  Vincent Ostrom aspired to replace contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
student of Elinor Ostrom’s from 1994 to 1996.  The author was not a student of Vincent Ostrom’s but acquired 
further interest in his work consequent to teaching courses on American political institutions. 
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“bad medicine” with a science of public affairs that would work as its artisans intend (V. Ostrom 
2008b).  From the 1971 lectures that comprise the core of The Intellectual Crisis in American 
Public Administration until the end of his career, Ostrom systematically criticized and urged 
reform of the first principles of mainstream American political science and public administration 
theory.
 4
  He described the intellectual mainstream as a paradigm challenge “of Copernican 
proportions” to the premises of democratic self-government as the Framers understood it and as 
generations of Americans had practiced it; and he offered his own paradigmatic response 
modeled on Thomas Kuhn’s template for scientific change (V. Ostrom 1977, p. 1509, 2008b). 
The critique is sweeping.  In published and (previously) unpublished work spanning five 
decades, Ostrom (1994, pp. 211f.) details normative, metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, 
theoretical, and empirical problems with mainstream claims to knowledge of “the art and science 
of association.”5  He links some problems in the intellectual mainstream to difficulties of 
language and methodological limitations (V. Ostrom 1977, p. 1510, 1980); however, problems of 
language and methods are secondary to and in many ways explained by problematic epistemic 
choices made by mainstream analysts of politics, government, and administration (V. Ostrom 
20008b).  He further notes that such epistemic errors are discoverable (and presumably 
remediable) if scholars maintain the habit of thinking critically about the way they think about 
social reality (V. Ostrom 2012 [1991], 2012 [1993], 2008b). 
                                                          
4
 Barbara Allen’s commentary and a selection of essays and correspondence relating to Ostrom’s work with the 
Alaska statehood constitutional convention in Volume 1 of The Quest to Understand Human Affairs: Natural 
Resources Policy and Essays on Community and Collective Choice (2011) describe how he came to realize the 
continuing relevance of constitutional choice to contemporary problems in policy analysis.  The essays in Volume 2 
of The Quest to Understand Human Affairs: Essays on Collective, Constitutional and Epistemic Choice (2012) 
provide examples of the global reach of his efforts to understand the terms and conditions of political experiments 
wherever communities of people attempt to govern themselves. 
5
 Ostrom uses the term “art and science of association” with direct acknowledgment of Tocqueville’s extended 
examination of what citizens in a self-governing society would have to know in order to constitute a self-governing 
society (1994, pp. 211f.).  Ostrom (2008b, pp. 65f.) refers to “democratic administration” as the “rejected 
alternative” of mainstream scholarship that favors bureaucratic administration.  I use “Ostrom’s democratic 
alternative” in Table 1 below to refer to the whole of his theory of democratic self-government in a limited 
constitutional republic. McGinnis (2011) delivers a succinct and well-organized summary of Workshop language. 
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3. Thomas Kuhn and scientific paradigms 
 Thomas Kuhn used the term “scientific paradigm” in three ways that apply to the 
evaluation of Vincent Ostrom’s critique and paradigm challenge.  A scientific paradigm can refer 
to “a way of doing science” (Godfrey-Smith 2006, p. 77).  It can refer to a successful experiment 
that is uniquely influential, an “exemplar” that solves an important puzzle or resolves a troubling 
anomaly (ibid.).  Or, a scientific paradigm can refer to a shared network of commitments and 
implicit knowledge that define a community of scientists (Kuhn 1996, pp. 40-2).  By all three 
definitions, Workshop scholars and investigators in their orbit work in an alternative to the 
mainstream paradigm of American political science. 
3.1.  Different ways of doing social science 
 Scientists engaged in different “ways of doing science” ask different questions and find 
the normative purposes of their work in different lines of inquiry (Kuhn 1996; Godfrey-Smith 
2006; Luker 2008). 
 
Workshop scholars, informed by the presumption that social order is 
polycentric, envision communities of people associating with each other and with other 
communities of people, their affairs governed by long-lasting, rule-ordered arrangements called 
institutions (E. Ostrom 1990, 2005, 2009, 2010).  “Different arrangements will lead to different 
results or consequences” summarizes the theoretical commitment to understanding the causes 
and effects of institutional diversity (V. Ostrom 2011 [1971], p. 180).  Different lines of 
empirical investigation logically follow different theoretical commitments, thereby revealing the 
normative commitments of the investigators.  Workshop scholars count trees, fish, water pumps, 
even lobsters to assess the performance of institutions.
6
 
                                                          
6
 For examples, see Acheson (2003), Blomquist (1992), Gibson (1999), Gibson, McKean, and E. Ostrom (2000), 
and E. Ostrom (1990). 
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The mainstream of political science, informed by the presumption that beneficial social 
orders are monocentric, is fundamentally concerned with discovering and legitimizing the 
putatively beneficent and singular power residing in the people.  The central question, posed by 
Robert Dahl, is “who governs?”7  According to Jeffrey Isaac8 (2014), Dahl defined the 
mainstream of American political science in the latter decades of the 20
th
 century.  As reported 
by Douglas Martin of The New York Times, James Fishkin
9
 assessed Dahl’s contributions to 
political science saying, “[Dahl] brought everybody back to the big picture, the big questions… 
What is the form of democracy that will live up to democratic aspirations?”  The mainstream 
answer, so obvious as to seem self-evidently true, is that democratic legitimacy requires 
universal participation among broadly equal citizens in the central democratic act of voting for 
the primary officers of government (Dahl 2002).  Robust, electorally based representative 
institutions form the core of contemporary democracies (Dahl 2002; Shapiro 2011).  The 
normative commitment to counting voters (but not trees and lobsters) follows logically.
10 
 
3.2.   Scientific paradigms as uniquely successful experiments 
The many honors and awards bestowed on Vincent and Elinor Ostrom recognize their 
roles in resolving several significant unsolved puzzles (anomalies) of interest to contemporary 
social scientists and their contributions to developing frameworks and theories that either did 
solve or promise to solve additional puzzles.  As Elinor herself noted, the success of these 
investigations owed much to Vincent Ostrom’s theorizing and in turn contributed to the further 
                                                          
7
 The question appears in the title of Robert Dahl’s seminal study of city government (Dahl 1961). 
8
 Isaac is a former Dahl student and serves (2009 to present (2015)) as the Editor In Chief of Perspectives on 
Politics, a publication of the American Political Association. 
9
 Fishkin is another former Dahl student who presently (2015) directs the Center for Deliberative Democracy at 
Stanford University.  The quote appears in Dahl’s obituary posted on The New York Times website February 7, 
2014. 
10
 For examples, see Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1980), Green and Gerber (2004),  and Nie, Verba, and 
Petrocik (1976). 
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development of theory of which he was also a contributor (E. Ostrom 2010).  One set of notably 
successful Workshop-sponsored “experiments” illuminate the point. 
In 1961, Vincent Ostrom and co-authors Charles Tiebout and Robert Warren proposed a 
theory of polycentric institutions for the organization of municipal services, thereby raising a 
rival to then-prevailing mainstream views favoring consolidated metropolitan government and 
setting the stage for empirical tests of monocentric versus polycentric systems.  Soon enough, 
Elinor Ostrom and others undertook studies of metropolitan police departments and other urban 
service organizations, testing claims made in the 1961 article.  These studies, informally known 
as “the police studies,” largely validated the feasibility of polycentric public service provision 
and delivery systems (McGinnis and E. Ostrom 2011).  They also engendered methodological 
advances, as Workshop investigators developed techniques for measuring municipal services, 
evaluating their cost and quality, and assessing the factors that influence municipal outputs (E. 
Ostrom 1971; E. Ostrom and Parks 1973; E. Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker 1974).  Moreover, the 
police studies contributed to the development of the concepts “public service industry” and 
“public economy” leading to further theoretical advances. 
In a co-authored essay first published in 1977, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom explain the 
relationship between the production and consumption attributes of certain goods and the 
organizational arrangements for providing and producing those goods.
11
  Jointly produced, 
jointly used, public goods had been described previously.
12
  The Ostroms (1994 [1977]) 
extended the application of the concept to the analysis of public service industries by locating 
“pure” public goods in a typology of goods organized according to production and use attributes.   
                                                          
11
 The essay was originally published in Savas (1977) and subsequently reprinted in Ostrom (1994). 
12
 The Ostroms acknowledge Aristotle for an early description of the problems of common use and Samuelson 
(1954), Buchanan (1970), and Olson (1965, 1969) for later contributions to describing public goods.   
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The Ostrom typology and the evidence supporting it resolved an anomaly of public 
administration theory by explaining what mainstream scholars could not.  Mainstream theorists 
presumed that the consolidation of municipal governments would improve the efficiency of 
public service provision and production and yet, the most centralized city administrations 
provided the worst services, whereas fragmented, overlapping, and small jurisdictions offered 
better services at lower cost (V. Ostrom 2008b).  Categorizing economic goods according to 
production and use attributes enables the analyst to conceptualize a polycentric public service 
economy capable of providing and producing complex packages of public, private, mixed, and 
co-produced public goods and services, a capability not theoretically possible according to 
conventional institutional approaches
13
 (V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 1994 [1977]).  By linking 
public economy and polycentric governance, the Ostroms constructed an empirically testable, 
deductive framework for matching the scale and scope of public goods and their effects to 
preferred organizational arrangements for service provision and production (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, 
and Warren 1961; McGinnis and E. Ostrom 2011).  In short, by the mid-1970’s, Workshop 
scholars had produced warrantable explanations of organizational pathologies associated with the 
consolidation efforts of 20
th
 century urban reformers, a central element of the critique embedded 
in Vincent Ostrom’s “bad medicine” hypothesis.  Moreover, the concept of the public economy 
represents a signal contribution to public choice theory.  Workshop scholars documented the 
existence, feasibility, and potential for superior performance of public service industries that are 
neither entirely state-run nor market-driven thereby exposing the harmful dichotomy of markets-
versus-states that [mis]informs much contemporary policy analysis (E. Ostrom 2010; Aligica and 
Boettke 2011). 
                                                          
13
 Coase (1960, 1974) made a similar point about the state of the discipline in economics when he wrote of 
institutional arrangements for providing and producing public goods and “bads” (i.e., social costs). 
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4. The shared network of commitments and implicit knowledge 
Kuhn also defines a scientific paradigm as a shared network (or constellation) of 
“conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological” commitments and implicit 
knowledge (Kuhn 1996, pp. 40-42, 181-186, quoted text from p. 42).  He further defines implicit 
knowledge by offering examples, such as the shared understanding among scientists of what 
constitutes acceptable predictive accuracy (ibid. 185).  Ostrom (2008b, 2012 [1991], pp. 253f.) 
follows Kuhn, characterizing theoretical commitments by the shared ontological and epistemic 
choices of scientists.  Ostrom proceeds by the method of textual exegesis to establish a 
mainstream constellation of commitments and a further contrasting set of alternative 
commitments.  Table1compares the differentiated networks of commitments that comprise the 
operational definitions of each “paradigm.” 
 Insert Table 1 about here…    
4.1.  (Quasi) metaphysical commitments: different realities, different politics 
The claim of ultimate political reality is a matter of central importance to the study of 
politics for the obvious reason that politics is entirely socially constructed.  Politics is what we 
make of it.  If “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” 
(Marx and Engels 1848) and if politics is “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1958) then 
we have expressed a commitment to one form of ultimate political reality.  If scholars and 
practitioners construct politics as an exercise in power, conflict, strategy, manipulation, and the 
pursuit of basic (self) interests, they will succeed in that construction (Lasswell and Kaplan 
1950; Schattschneider 1960; Riker 1986; Shapiro 2011).  Alternatively, if scholars and 
practitioners embrace a covenantal social reality based on reciprocity, mutuality, and deliberation 
in a spirit of curious enquiry (Allen 2005), then the possibility of cooperation for mutual benefit 
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arises and it becomes feasible to construct politics as a collective effort to stabilize expectations 
concerning joint and non-joint strategies (E. Ostrom 1990, 2005; Aligica and Boettke 2009, 
2011).  The reader may presume that the latter option is hopelessly naïve.
14
  Possibly so as 
Vincent Ostrom (1980) concedes, but the point, taken from Hobbes, is that values are 
inescapable components of all political theorizing.  We cannot answer the question of what 
politics is without also answering the question of what it is for. 
4.2.  The ontology of Hobbes: sovereignty and the unity of the commonwealth 
Vincent Ostrom’s commentary on Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty and the unity of the 
commonwealth marks several points of departure from the mainstream.  Ostrom (1980) concurs 
with Hobbes’s description of the commonwealth as a human artifact that contains its human 
“artificers” and with Hobbes’s formulation of the asymmetric power dynamic in the “rule, ruler, 
ruled” relationship necessary for a rule-ordered society.  Ostrom (1980, 1994) begins the critique 
of Hobbesian analytics by noting the contradiction between a constitutionally limited 
government, which presumes that constitutions can bind the governors, and Hobbes’s 
conceptualization of the sovereign who is above the laws of the commonwealth by virtue of his 
monopoly over authority relationships and the instruments of force (the “sword”).   Ostrom 
(1994, pp. 34-35) further notes that Hobbes’s state of nature does not account for the human 
capacity for language and learning used to develop a community of understanding that would 
oblige members of the community to abide by mutually agreed upon restraints.  In short, 
covenantal reasoning enables communities of persons to construct a sovereign who is bound by 
human (not divine) law and so the capacity for self-governance is within the reach of human 
                                                          
14
 Buchanan (1975) explores the conceptual basis for politics arising from contractarian (i.e., economically rational) 
reasoning, showing that multiple pathways to cooperative social orders are conceptually feasible. 
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intelligence (Allen 2005).  The “artificer” can do more than Leviathan’s author inclines to allow 
(E. Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992).
15
 
Scholars who dismiss federal structures as “paper pictures” and “exalt the representative 
body… to a position of absolute supremacy” (Wilson 1956, p. 203)16 construct the sovereign as a 
unitary power and so they construct “the internal structure of a commonwealth” along the same 
logical lines.  According to Hobbes (whose formulation Wilson adopted), the unity of the 
commonwealth proceeds from the unity of power in the organization of its government (V. 
Ostrom 1994, p. 38).  Ostrom (ibid.) continues, “Whenever we define a state as a monopoly of 
the legitimate exercise of force in a society, Hobbes’s attributes of sovereign authority 
necessarily apply as a manifestation of monopoly.  Unity of power implies a monopoly of 
authority relationships in a society.” 
 If “the unity of power and of law are necessary to the peace and concord of 
commonwealths” (V. Ostrom 1994, p. 38) then, 
Wilson, Bagehot, and many others who follow their line of reasoning essentially 
accept Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty and presume that the unity of a 
commonwealth derives from a unitary organization of governmental authority 
rather than from the unity of the people being represented by a government.  
Political responsibility can be attained in their formulation only by having a single 
clearly visible authority who can be held accountable for political leadership.  
Diverse, overlapping political communities, they would argue, cannot hold a 
multitude of officials accountable.  It is this conception that has led a major 
                                                          
15
 Concerning the importance of values and beliefs to effective constitutional limits on the power of governments, 
Ostrom and Buchanan appear in complete agreement.  According to Buchanan (1975, p. 51), “Whether it is possible 
to constrain the powers of government… can never be proven empirically.  It is at this point, however, that 
individuals’ attitudes toward reality seem more important than reality itself.” 
16
 The passage quoted is reproduced in V. Ostrom (2011 [1991], p. 280). 
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component of the American intellectual community in this century to rely upon 
models of parliamentary government and bureaucratic administration as providing 
the normative standards for reforming and restructuring government in the 
American political system (V. Ostrom 2011 [1978], p. 280). 
4.3.  Ostrom’s epistemological critique: collective intentionality and 
constitutional order 
Vincent Ostrom’s (2008b) criticism of the command (attributed to Walter Bagehot and 
Woodrow Wilson) to penetrate the “façade” of politics and by doing so to observe society 
directly as a “living reality” is as trenchant as it is central to understanding his critique of the 
intellectual mainstream (Aligica and Boettke 2011).  In the first instance, human reality is 
“plagued by counterintentional and counterintuitive relationships” (V. Ostrom 1994, p. 68), so 
every collection of social facts requires interpretation, i.e., the informed application of the 
observer’s skill and values (V. Ostrom 1980, 2012 [1991]).  Direct, value-free observation of 
society is impossible.  All human artifacts, including governments, “require knowledgeable 
experimenters who know what they are doing” and for the observer to understand the 
experiment, he or she must have access to knowledge of the design principles employed by the 
artisan (V. Ostrom 2012 [1991], p. 265).  Using an electric generating station as his example, 
Ostrom explains,  
An observer taking Wilson’s advice and looking at the living reality of a power 
plant generating electricity would not be likely to survive if he escaped from 
theory and attached himself to facts…  The operation of an electric utility always 
occurs subject to the intelligent discharge of human artisanship…  Such a utility 
may, in turn, be linked to water systems, or other systems of relationships, 
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capable of generating and using electricity…  Human societies, thus, are 
constituted by the simultaneous operation of diverse experiments variously linked 
to one another (2012 [1991], p. 265). 
 To evaluate the artisanship employed to construct “variously linked” governance 
institutions, one must acknowledge the intentions of the artisans and the terms and conditions of 
the political experiments undertaken to construct those institutions (V. Ostrom 1980; c.f., von 
Mises 2011 [1940]).  Institutions are describable by the rule-ordered relationships they embody.  
Rules take form as sentences that achieve meaning in a commonly understood language.  
Understanding the artisanship of institutional design requires resort to a philosophy of language 
which Ostrom finds in an essay by John Searle (1969). 
Searle (1969, 1998) employs the term collective intentionality to explain the formation 
and evolution of language rules.  Collective intentionality is the common knowledge that allows 
the speaker and listener to understand each other (ibid.).  The progression of understanding 
eventuates in shared language rules that form the basis for the rule-ordered relationships we call 
institutions (V. Ostrom 1980, 2012 [1991]).  The twinned presumptions that collective 
intentionality exists and that informed observers can describe the collective intentionality of a 
community of people by reference to the written and unwritten rules applicable to a specified 
social setting enable one to ascertain “institutional facts [that] can only be explained in terms of 
the constitutive rules which underlie them” (Searle 1969, p. 52).  “[N]o institution can be fully 
understood without taking into account the ways in which the participants conceptualize the 
nature of their interaction” (McGinnis and E. Ostrom 2011, p. 20). 
 The requirement of first understanding constitutive rules to explain institutional facts 
reveals more fully the implications of Ostrom’s epistemological critique of the mainstream in 
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political science.  We cannot observe the living reality of human society intelligibly without 
reference to the constitutive rules of the society we seek to observe.  The commitment to 
explanation “in terms of the constitutive rules” differentiates The Workshop’s epistemic 
commitments from the mainstream.  “[I]n order to have rule by assemblies, it is logically 
necessary to have a shared community of understanding and agreement about the rules for 
assembly and what it means to govern by assembly” (V. Ostrom  1994, p. 41, emphasis in the 
original). 
4.4.  The theoretical commitment: the open public realm, federalism, fallible 
citizen/artisans, and democratic maladies  
Vincent Ostrom links democratic self-government to a theory of polycentric social order 
that presumes general conditions of constitutional liberty, i.e., the liberty of free people to form 
organizations to achieve collective aims in an open public realm.  The open public realm is a 
three-part enterprise, comprised of voting, federalism, and citizen-artisans skilled in the art and 
science of association.  Democracy conceptualized as an open public realm demands more of 
theory and of its citizens than the mainstream conceptualization of democracy as essentially 
electoral, a realm wherein ‘nearly universal suffrage and competitive and fair elections for most 
of the primary offices of government’ are sufficient for maintaining a self-governing polity 
(Huntington 1991-92; Dahl 2002; Shapiro 2011; Schumpeter 1942).  Contested elections for 
most important public offices, or “dependence on the people… [as] the primary control on the 
government” is “no doubt” a requirement of democracy (The Federalist 51).  Nonetheless, 
Ostrom rejects the notion of equating the practice of democracy to voting for elected 
representatives and/or ballot referendums. 
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To assert that the voice of the people is the voice of God is absurd.  To assert that 
democracy is majority rule is equally absurd (Ostrom 1994, p. 56). 
Simple systems of majority rule run the risk that “the citizens of such a republic [will] relinquish 
the means of governing themselves collectively to rulers who prostrate themselves before the 
majority” (Allen 2005, p. 185) and “that the activities of government officials become reduced to 
the provision of special privilege to narrow groups” (McGinnis and V. Ostrom 2012 [1999], p. 
512). 
The “neatly sequential process of representative democracy in which citizens express 
their policy preferences by electing representatives who then write complex laws that have to be 
interpreted by administrative agencies in the form of detailed regulations” inexorably erodes the 
repositories of reciprocity, trust, and mutuality between citizens and public authorities and 
among associations of citizens acting on their own initiatives that sustain self-governing societies 
(V. Ostrom 1994, 2008a, 2008b, 2011 [1999], 2012 [1999], pp. 399-400; quoted passage from 
McGinnis and E. Ostrom 2011, p. 21).  When parliaments and bureaucracies or presidents acting 
as unitary commanders-in-chief fail to deliver desired results, mainstream theorists presume that 
someone or something has interfered with the perfect working of representative government.
17
  
Vincent Ostrom does not deny the implications for politics and policy of legacy institutions, bad 
people, bad objects, and rhetorical manipulation, but he directs primary analytic attention to the 
associational understandings of the people, policymakers, and the scholars who study them.  
Ostrom (1994, 2008a) reminds readers that the logic of constitutional choice presented in The 
Federalist demonstrates that inherited law, virtue and vice, named objects, and undesirable 
properties of the human condition are things that a warrantable theory of self-government 
                                                          
17
 Hacker and Pierson (2010) provide an engaging example of this mode of argument.  Constitutional arrangements 
subject to criticism include the Electoral College, Senate apportionment, and gerrymandering by state legislatures 
(Dahl 2002).  The body of related commentary is extensive. 
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accounts for.  If we presume that such a theory is possible, the following statements must be true.  
If they are not true, then the possibility of democratic self-government is called into doubt.  (1) 
Communities of people can select their constitutions by reflection and choice and are not always 
dependent on accident and force (The Federalist 1; V. Ostrom 2008a, p. 27).  (2) If people were 
angels, no government would be necessary, but since they are not, governments are necessary 
(The Federalist 51; V. Ostrom 2008a, p. 65).  (3) Properly specified federal arrangements create 
the potential for a government strong enough to serve the public’s purposes, yet also flexible 
enough to provide and produce complex packages of public goods and services (The Federalist 
23; V. Ostrom 1994, 2008a, p. 67).  (4) Constitutions are laws made by the people establishing 
the terms and conditions that bind the government (The Federalist 15, 41, 51; V. Ostrom 2008a, 
pp. 41f., 68).  The theory of federalism, properly understood, accounts for the absence of virtue 
among office holders, has no inherent limit on its capacity to govern objects or reform present 
law, and relies for effect not on great abstractions but rather upon communities of people with 
the skills and the collective intentionality to establish and ordain just laws that achieve their 
intended aims (V. Ostrom 1994, 2008a). 
 Federal and polycentric institutional arrangements therefore comprise the necessary 
second component (after voting) of Ostrom’s open public realm, i.e., the self-governing polity, 
although not solely by the conventionally noted division of enumerated powers among branches 
of the national government and not with the additional formulation of the compound republic, 
understood as the divided or dual delegation of governing authority to the states and the national 
government (V. Ostrom 2008a).  Divided and enumerated powers in a compound republic are 
necessary but not sufficient institutional arrangements (to sustain the open public realm).  
Federal and polycentric institutions must be constituted as “more than the instrumentalities of 
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government, narrowly construed” and moreover, “[t]his policy of supplying, by opposite and 
rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human 
affairs, private as well as public” (emphasis added) (V. Ostrom 1994, pp. 208, 224; The 
Federalist 51). 
 Federal polycentric social orders do not emerge spontaneously.  Their constitution 
requires citizens who engage in the conscious and conscientious practice of organizational 
artisanship (V. Ostrom 1980).  For democratic self-governance to endure, citizens must be 
responsible governors of themselves who “take account of the interests of others” and they must 
have the “habits of heart and mind” (along with the knowledge and authority) to conduct their 
affairs in multi-organizational settings characterized by a culture of deliberation conducted in a 
spirit of curious enquiry and self-interest “properly understood” (V. Ostrom 1994, pp. 199-221; 
Allen 2005; McGinnis and V. Ostrom 2012 [1999], p. 515). 
 Vincent Ostrom’s diagnosis of the two great maladies that afflict democratic societies, 
tyranny of the majority and democratic despotism, reflects a synthesis of Madison’s ideas about 
federal theory and Tocqueville’s reflections on the influence of democratic ideas on the habits of 
heart and mind of citizens in a democracy.  Tyranny of the majority implies a problem of 
constitutional design, a failure to achieve “a judicious modification and mixture of the 
FEDERAL PRINCIPLE” (quote from The Federalist 51 emphasis in the original; V. Ostrom and 
Allen 2012 [1994], p. 491, McGinnis and V. Ostrom 2012 [1999]).  Democratic despotism 
implies “a crisis of knowledge, skill, and moral responsibility” precipitated by “the failure of 
citizens to maintain the habits of heart and mind” that sustain the open public realm (McGinnis 
and V. Ostrom 2012 [1999], pp. 528, 516). 
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 Vincent Ostrom’s (1980, 2012 [1991]) theoretical commitment rests ultimately on a 
model of humans as boundedly rational, fallible learners.  The capacity for language enables 
humans to record and pass on what they learn from their mistakes (V. Ostrom 1997).  Language 
may also be used to conceal mistakes or to deceive others about the nature of lessons learned 
(ibid.).  The human capacity for error extends to committing fundamental epistemic errors, 
including three in particular that endanger American democracy: the fantasy of public servants as 
omnicompetent problem solvers, the delusion of omniscience in rulemaking, and the illusion of 
infinite wealth (V. Ostrom 1980, 1994, 1997, 2008b, 2012 [1991]). 
Citizens present the fantasy of omnicompetence when they project upon a public official 
or government agency the superhuman capacity to solve all problems and so petition said agency 
or official “to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of [their] happiness; [that] provides for their 
security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their 
principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their 
inheritances: [all this]… to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living” 
(Tocqueville 1899 [1835, 1840]: Vol. 2, Part 4, Chap. 6).  Delusional intimations of omniscience 
present themselves in the congressional practice of writing complex bills, measured in the 
hundreds or thousands of pages of original text to be implemented through thousands of 
additional pages of federal regulations, all presuming to achieve grand, morally unassailable 
outcomes by minutely accounting for countless contingencies predicted to occur across time and 
among immensely varied ecological, social, and cultural contexts (V. Ostrom 2012 [1999], p. 
400).   
The illusion of infinite wealth presents itself in the selection of statutory objectives, 
public obligations, and policy designs that ignore the condition of scarcity.  When people pretend 
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that scarcity does not constrain their potential actions, they deny themselves objective means for 
evaluating the terms and conditions of their political experiments (V. Ostrom 1997, pp. 79-80).  
Zero tolerance, no child left behind, zero discharge, total information awareness, and other 
absolute goals imply that any citizen who raises a question about the costs incurred in dollars, 
wasted time, liberties lost, or incidental injustices imposed on innocent bystanders from 
measures taken in support of some unassailable public purpose therefore supports morally odious 
conduct such as bullying or drug abuse, substandard schools for disadvantaged children, water 
pollution, terrorism, and a host of other social ailments.  The presumption that some entity called 
“the government” has unlimited resources for enforcing rules, for behavioral counseling, for 
tutoring and remedial reading, for installing pollution control devices, and for myriad other 
services is a manifestation of the illusion of infinite wealth which liberates voters and 
policymakers from the obligation to consider tradeoffs among lesser evils or greater goods (V. 
Ostrom 1994). 
4.5.  Ostrom’s empirical critique: explaining (or not) counter-intentional 
outcomes 
Vincent Ostrom evaluates the empirical performance of political theory by relating policy 
outcomes to the intentionality of policymakers (1980, 2008b, 2012 [1991]).  Intentionality 
occupies the place that paradigm-indicated expectations do in normal scientific inquiry (von 
Mises 2011 [1940]).  Counter-intentional policy outcomes are equivalent to experimental 
anomalies in the natural sciences.  Political experiments that generate anomalous outcomes 
signal the need for “critical reflection” on the “knowledgeable conduct” of the people conducting 
the experiment (V. Ostrom 2012 [1993], p. 305). 
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Ostrom (2008b, pp. 54-5, 2012 [1994], p. 334) describes three types of counter-
intentional outcomes, ambiguous (or no) effect at high cost, monopolization of public goods 
leading to the erosion of their value, and unequivocally counter-intentional results.  Of the three, 
only the third, when the outcome is the reverse of what the experimenters intend at the time of 
the experiment, presents an unambiguous paradigm challenge.  The first two outcome types 
provide opportunities to test alternate theories or to demonstrate more powerful explanations of 
social and political behavior.  But they do not plainly and unequivocally contradict the premises 
of mainstream political theory and policy analysis.  For example, Workshop studies of urban 
services provide warrantable explanations of why certain organizational arrangements deliver 
better or less expensive public services than others, but demonstrating that the configuration of 
metropolitan government matters does not unequivocally rule out “quality of central 
management” as an explanatory factor in the performance of urban service organizations. 
The second type of counter-intentional outcome occurs when the value of public goods is 
eroded because organizational arrangements fail to manage incompatible uses or create 
opportunities for a single-user or a single class of users to dominate consumption of the good.  
Workshop and mainstream analytics offer competing explanations of use dominance of public 
goods.  The typology of goods and the multi-organizational public service economy offer one set 
of premises for explaining use dominance (V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom (1994 [1977]); so too, do 
theories of economic regulation (Stigler 1971), cartels, i.e., “privileged groups” (Olson 1965), or 
the politics of organized interests (Salisbury 1992; Walker 1991).  The over-determination of 
facts by theory means that this type of counter-intentional outcome cannot resolve a paradigm 
challenge because as Kuhn (1996, p. 199) notes, 
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Debates over theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical 
or mathematical proof… That debate is about premises, and its recourse is to 
persuasion as a prelude to the possibility of proof. 
The third type, unequivocally counter-intentional outcomes, unambiguously undermines 
prevailing political theory just as a well-designed, successful experiment falsifies the null 
hypothesis.  The outcomes are plainly incompatible with prior beliefs.  Vincent Ostrom (2012 
[1986]) defines the type by recounting the political and economic consequences of the Bolshevik 
Revolution and the subsequent installation of Soviet-style governments throughout Eastern 
Europe.  He quotes Milovan Djilas’s account,  
Everything happened differently in the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries 
from what the leaders—even such prominent ones as Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and 
Bukharin—anticipated.  They expected the state would rapidly wither away, that 
democracy would be strengthened.  The reverse happened (ibid. 227, emphasis 
added by Ostrom). 
5. Conclusion: the continuing relevance of Vincent Ostrom’s critique 
In the years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, presidents and 
congressional majorities of both parties acted as if “suddenly aware that ‘everything’ is 
connected, [and so] highly centralized responses to myriad problems seemed efficient, 
effective—and absolutely right” (B. Allen in the foreword to V. Ostrom 2008b, p. xii).18  Post 
9/11, official Washington embraced a “new” policy style that looks very similar to the “old” 
policy style that prompted Vincent Ostrom’s original 1971 warning of bad medicine in the 
mainstream of public administration theory.  Legislation aimed at a morally unassailable 
                                                          
18
 The quoted passage by Barbara Allen refers to policymakers in the middle decades of the 20
th
 century who were 
motivated to consolidate municipal governments by a newfound awareness of the interconnections among 
environmental, education, and law enforcement problems. 
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purpose, measured in the hundreds or thousands of pages of original text, assigned to a single 
“accountable” authority, and implemented through thousands of additional pages of federal 
regulations presumes impossibilities of the human condition and ignores the counterintuitive 
properties of human affairs thus creating commensurate potentials for the realization of counter-
intentional outcomes (V. Ostrom 2012 [1994], pp. 323f.).  The USA Patriot Act, No Child Left 
Behind, Sarbanes-Oxley, the Homeland Security Act, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act are familiar titles (Wikipedia.org 2013).  The 
analyst who examines the contents and implementation scenarios of these laws might conclude 
that Ostrom’s warning of bad medicine remains relevant, even prescient, albeit unheeded.  
Presumptions of omnicompetence, omniscience, infinite wealth, and a perfectly realized, 
universal system of laws do not comprise a warrantable theory of politics and policy design (V. 
Ostrom 1994, 1997, 2008b).  Proceeding as if they do almost certainly assures that great political 
experiments will generate great disappointments. 
Vincent Ostrom and scholars in the intellectual mainstream converge obviously in their 
shared preference for limited constitutional government organized on democratic principles.  
They also share a value commitment to a society characterized by high levels of liberty and 
justice.  Adherents of mainstream political theory believe the best way to achieve such a society 
is by establishing the governing arrangement commonly called a social welfare state, 
conceptualized as a neat process of representation and detailed rulemaking by professional 
administrators (V. Ostrom 2008b, 1994, 1997).  Ostrom’s (2012 [1994]) critique offers reasons 
to suspect that the outcome of such an arrangement may be unequivocally counter-intentional to 
the hopes of its proponents.  The reverse may happen! 
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Ian Shapiro (2011) describes a puzzling reversal of expectations with a query about why 
after decades of expanding voter participation among lower income voters, the United States 
pursues policies that promote regressive income redistribution.  This author notes the concurrent 
nationalization and centralization of policymaking and the further fact, reported on April 1, 2014, 
by Tom Van Riper of Forbes, that six of the ten richest counties in America are now located in 
the Washington DC metropolitan region.  In an article first posted on September 19, 2012, 
Washington Post reporters Carol Morello and Ted Mellnick quote William Frey, a demographer 
with the Brookings Institution. “When people make the argument that $250,000 is middle 
income, that’s way higher than most of the country regards as middle income. But here in 
Washington, your next-door neighbor has that kind of income.” 
People in a federal republic are as vulnerable as Hobbes’s sovereign to human 
fallibility and to the natural punishments that follow erroneous judgments.  So 
long as they are willing to struggle with one another, not to gain dominance and 
subdue others by force, but to increase understanding of what it means to live a 
life of covenantal relationships, they have the basis for the design and conduct of 
great social experiments.  Those experiments, however, will certainly fail 
whenever people think of themselves as omniscient observers capable of 
functioning as omnicompetent overseers who know what represents the greatest 
good for the greatest number.  This, human beings cannot know in a world 
plagued by counterintentional and counterintuitive relationships (V. Ostrom 1994, 
p. 68). 
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Table 1: Differentiating the network of commitments 
 Commitment Intellectual mainstream Ostrom’s democratic alternative 
(Quasi) Metaphysical 
Politics is fundamentally about 
power.  Interests motivate human 
social interactions.a 
Politics is about stabilizing shared 
expectations concerning joint and 
non-joint strategies.b 
Ontological 
Politics is comprised of strategies 
of dominance and manipulation to 
advance basic (self) interests.c 
Politics includes the potential for 
strategies of dominance and 
manipulation and the potential for 
strategies of cooperation to 
advance shared goals (i.e., public 
goods).d 
Epistemological 
Value-free observers can observe 
society directly as a "living 
reality."e 
Intelligible observation of society 
requires understanding the 
collective intentionality of the 
people or community being 
observed.f 
Theoretical 
Monocentric and hierarchical 
organization has beneficent 
effects on social order. Democracy 
obtains by holding those in power 
electorally accountable.g 
Conditions of liberty and justice are 
achievable in an open public realm 
sustained by citizens who are 
conscientious and skillful artisans in 
the science of association.h 
Empirical 
Anomalous results demonstrate 
the need for stronger instruments 
of social control. Organizational 
advantage derives from more 
perfectly realized administrative 
measures.i 
Anomalous results create 
opportunities for learning and the 
demand for new rules to stabilize 
expectations. Compliance is 
contingent.  Organizational 
advantage derives from matching 
the scale and scope of public 
services to their public effects.j 
 
                                                          
a
 Shapiro (1996, p. 50), Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), Lasswell (1958) 
b
 E. Ostrom (1990, 2005), E. Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) 
c
 Schattschneider (1960), Riker (1982, 1986) 
d
 V. Ostrom (1980, 1994) 
e
 Wilson (1956) 
f
 V. Ostrom (1980), V. Ostrom (2012 [1991], pp. 253f.) 
g
 Wilson (1887), Schumpeter (1942), Dahl (2002), Shapiro (2011) 
h
 V. Ostrom (1994), V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) 
i
 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (no date), U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2006), Goldsmith and Eggers (2004), Osborne and Gaebler (1993), 
Greenwald and MacAskill (2013), Gross (2013) 
j
 E. Ostrom (1990, 2005), V. Ostrom (2008b), V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom (1994 [1977]) 
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